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SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS IN WASHINGTON-THE
STATUTORY RESTRAINT UPON INVOLUNTARY
ALIENATION
A spendthrift trust provides either by express provision or by statute
that the interest of the beneficiary is inalienable and that creditors cannot

reach the interest in satisfaction of their claims.' A large majority of
American jurisdictions recognize spendthrift trusts by statute, court deci-

sion, or both. 2 Washington law contains an explicit recognition of
spendthrift trusts in case law 3 and an implicit recognition by statute4

which restricts involuntary alienation.
This Comment first examines the historical origins of section 6.32.250
of the Washington Revised Code, the Washington statute which greatly
restricts the involuntary alienation of a beneficial trust interest. It then
documents the problems that this statute has created for Washington
courts. Finally, it concludes that section 6.32.250 has created needless
confusion 5 and recommends that the Washington legislature either repeal
or revise the statute.
1. Milner v. Outcalt, 36 Wn. 2d 720, 721-22, 219 P.2d 982, 984 (1950); E. GRIswoLD,
SPENDTmRIFr TRUSTS § 1 (2d ed. 1947); RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TRusrs § 152 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as RESTATEMET]; 2 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 151 (3d ed. 1967). See G.G. BOGERT &
G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 222 (rev. 2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
BOGERT]. For a review of the law of spendthrift trusts in Washington, see Wicker, Spendthrift Trusts,
10 GONZ. L. REv.1, 7-13 (1974).
Throughout this Comment, trusts that derive their spendthrift quality from a statute are referred to
as statutory spendthrift trusts, and those that derive their spendthrift quality from an express trust
provision are referred to as express spendthrift trusts. In addition, a beneficiary's assignment of his or
her trust interest is referred to as voluntary alienation, and a creditor's reaching of a beneficiarydebtor's trust interest in satisfaction of a claim is referred to as involuntary alienation.
2. See E. GRuswoLD, supra note 1, §§ 53-61; 2 A. ScoTr, supranote 1, § 152.1.
3. Milner v. Outcalt, 36 Wn. 2d 720, 722, 219 P.2d 982, 984 (1950). See infra notes 33-34 and
accompanying text.
4. See WASH. REv. CODE § 6.32.250 (1981), which provides:
This chapter does not authorize the seizure of, or other interference with, any property which
is expressly exempt by law from levy and sale by virtue of an execution, or any money, thing in
action or other property held in trust for a judgment debtor where the trust has been created by,
or the fund so held in trust has proceeded from, a person other than the judgment debtor; or the
earnings of the judgment debtor for his personal services rendered within sixty days next before
the institution of the special proceeding, where it is made to appear by his oath or otherwise that
those earnings are necessary for the use of a family wholly or partly supported by his labor.
In Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Crosby, 42 Wn. 2d 234, 243, 254 P.2d 732, 738 (1953), the court
stated that "the practical effect of [WASH. REV. CODE § 6.32.250] has been to clothe every active
trust with statutory spendthrift provisions, at least in so far as attempts by creditors of a beneficiary to
reach his interest by legal process are concerned."
5. The main source of the confusion is that § 6.32.250 conflicts with the creditor-oriented policies underlying many other Washington statutes and court decisions. See infra part II.
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I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF WASHINGTON SPENDTHRIFT
TRUST LAW

A.

The HistoricalOrigin of Section 6.32.250

The Washington legislature enacted the original version of section
6.32.250 in 18936 as part of a group of statutes dealing with supplemental
proceedings. 7 It prohibited a creditor from seizing or otherwise interfering with certain property belonging to the debtor. The statute was
modeled after two sections of the New York Revised Statutes of 1828.8 A

brief examination of these New York statutes provides an understanding
of the origin and effect of the 1893 Washington legislation.
1.

The New York Revised Statutes of 1828
The New York Revised Statutes of 18289 addressed the alienability of a

beneficiary's trust interest in two separate articles. The revisers intended
to simplify the alienability of real property interests and to increase the
security of creditors through the revised provisions. Their comments indi-

cate that they were concerned with the problems created by the uncertainties of the prior system. 10
6. Act of March 15, 1893, ch. 133, § 25, 1893 Wash. Laws 435, 441 (codified at WASH REV
CODE § 6.32.250 (1981)). Section 6.32.250 has remained unaltered since its enactment in 1893.
7. The supplemental proceedings statutes appear in WASH. REV. CODE ch. 6.32. For a brief summary of the purpose of these statutes, see infra note 27.
8. See E. GRISWOLD. supra note 1, § 230. The two sections of the New York statute first appeared in 2 N.Y. REV. STAT part 3 , ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 2, §§ 38-39 (1829).
9. In 1824, the New York legislature appointed three revisers to revise and codify for reenactment the laws of New York. 3 N.Y. REV. STAT. app. 403 (1836). The result of the revisers' efforts
was the New York Revised Statutes of 1828. See N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N. COMMUNICATION AND
STUDY RELATING TO RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND RELATED MATTERS 4 (1936) (primarily authored by Powell & Whiteside), reprintedin N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT
at 473, 476 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Powell & Whiteside]. For a discussion of the effect of the
1828 statutes upon the power of alienation in New York, see Whiteside, Suspension of the Power of
Alienation in New York, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 31 (1928).
10. The revisers' comments state:
The Revisers will not conceal that they attach much importance to the provisions of this Chapter [1 N.Y. REV. STAT part 2, ch. 1 (1829) ....
[Tlhese provisions, if adopted, will sweep
away an immense mass of useless refinements and distinctions; will relieve the law of real property, to a great extent, from its abstruseness and uncertainty, and render it, as a system, intelligible and consistent: that the security of creditors and purchasers will be increased; the investigation of titles much facilitated; the means of alienation be rendered far more simple and less
expensive; and finally, that numerous sources of vexatious litigation, will be perpetually closed.
3 N.Y. REV. STAT. app. 584 (1836).
The uncertainties of the prior system of trusts which the revisers sought to correct included those
caused by the formal distinctions between legal and equitable estates, the unlimited life and indefinite
purposes of active trusts, and the creation of secret resulting trusts. 3 N.Y. REV. STAT. app. 583
(1836).

Spendthrift Trusts in Washington
The first article was the uses and trusts article", which addressed the
alienability of a beneficiary's trust interest. 12 Contrary to the expressed
intent of the revisers, however, several key sections of the article actually
restricted the alienability of trust interests and decreased the security of
creditors. Section 55 of the statute authorized the settlor of an express
trust to provide an income interest of rents and profits of land for the use
of the beneficiary. 13 Section 63 imposed a statutory spendthrift provision
upon the beneficiary's income interest in section 55 trusts, thereby prohibiting the beneficiary from voluntarily assigning his income interest. 14
The statute was less restrictive of involuntary alienation. Section 57 allowed a creditor to reach that portion of the income beneficiary's interest

11. 1 N.Y. REv. STAT. part 2, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 2 (1829). These provisions apply only to real
property trusts. 1 N.Y. REv. STAT. part 2, ch. 1 (1829).
A "use" has been defined as "[a] right in one person, called the "cestui que use," to take the
profits of land of which another has the legal title and possession, together with the duty of defending
the same, and of making estates thereof according to the direction of the cestui que use." BLACK'S
LAW DICTiONARY 1382 (5th ed. 1979). For a discussion of uses, the Statute of Uses, and modem
American trust law, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 67-73; and 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§§ 1.17-1.32 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
12. As an initial limitation on trust interests, the statute abolished all uses and trusts involving
estates in real property except those authorized by article two. 1 N.Y. REv. STAT. part 2, ch. 1, tit. 2,
art. 2, § 45 (1829).
13. 1 N.Y. REv. STAT. part 2, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 2, § 55(3) (1829). Express trusts could have been
created for any of the following purposes:
1. To sell lands for the benefit of creditors;
2. To sell, mortgage or lease lands, for the benefit of legatees, or for the purpose of satisfying
any charge thereon;
3. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and apply them to the education and support, or
either, of any person, during the life of such person, or for any shorter term, subject to the rules
prescribed in the first Article of this Title;
4. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and to accumulate the same, for the purposes and
within the limits prescribed in the first Article of this Title.
Id. § 55 (punctuation changed to conform to modem usage).
The word "use" was substituted for the phrase "education and support, or either" in § 55(3) by an
amendment in the Laws of 1830, ch. 320, § 10. Powell & Whiteside, supra note 9, at 56 n.126. The
result of this change of language was to broaden the spendthrift provision imposed by § 63. See infra
note 14. After the amendment, § 63 prohibited a beneficiary's voluntary alienation of the trust funds
directed for any use by the beneficiary, a much broader restriction than one directed at only those trust
funds to be employed for the education or support of the beneficiary. The amendment appears to be
an oversight, in view of the intent of the revisers to promote alienability. See supra note 10. See
Powell & Whiteside, supranote 9, at 56; E. GRISWOLD -supranote 1, § 66.
14. 1 N.Y. REv. STAT. part 2, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 2, § 63 (1829) provides:
No person beneficially interested in a trust for the receipt of the rents and profits of lands, can
assign or in any manner dispose of such interest; but the rights and interest of every person for
whose benefit a trust for the payment of a sum in gross is created, are assignable.
Later commentators viewed this statutory restriction on voluntary alienation as a complete innovation. See Powell & Whiteside, supranote 9, at 56. In 1828, common law restraints upon the alienation of absolute interests, legal or equitable, were generally ineffective. Id. at 57 n. 135.
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in the real property trust which exceeded the amount necessary for the
beneficiary's education and support. 15
The second article, which dealt with the general powers, duties, and
jurisdiction of the court of chancery, also addressed the alienability of a
beneficiary's trust interest. 16 That article imposed a statutory spendthrift
restriction upon a beneficiary's trust interest in a court of chancery proceeding if the judgment debtor-income beneficiary was not the settlor. 17
This sweeping restriction on the judgment creditor's reach seemingly
contradicted the broader reach granted creditors under section 57 of the
uses and trusts article. ' 8 Further, the chancery provisions contradicted the
revisers' policy to increase the security of creditors. 19
2.

JudicialTreatment of the New York Statutes

The inconsistencies of these two articles caused New York courts many
problems. 20 One such problem was the degree of alienability of a beneficiary's income interest in a real property trust. 2 1 Though section 57 of the
uses and trusts article allowed the involuntary alienation of that portion of
a beneficiary's interest in a real property trust which exceeded the amount
necessary for his or her support, the court of chancery article prohibited
all such alienation in chancery proceedings if the beneficiary was not also
the settlor.
The conflict between the two articles was resolved in Williams v.
15. 1N.Y. REV. STAT part 2, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 2, § 57 (1829).
16. 2 N.Y. REv. STAT. part 3, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 2 (1829). Two sections of that article apply here:
Whenever an execution against the property of a defendant, shall have been issued on a judgment at law, and shall have been returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part, the party suing out
such execution, may file a bill in chancery against such defendant, and any other person, to
compel the discovery of any property or thing in action, belonging to the defendant, and of any
property, money, or thing in action, due to him, or held in trust for him; and to prevent the
transfer of any such property, money or thing in action, or the payment or delivery thereof, to
the defendant, except where such trust has been created by, or the fund so held in trust has
proceeded from, some person other than the defendant himself.
The court shall have power to compel such discovery, and to prevent such transfer, payment
or delivery, and to decree satisfaction of the sum remaining due on such judgment, out of any
personal property, money or things in action belonging to the defendant, or held in trust for him,
with the exception above stated, which shall be discovered by the proceedings in chancery,
whether the same were originally liable to be taken in execution at law or not.
2 N.Y. REv. STAT. part 3, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 2,§§ 38-39 (1829).
17. See supra note 16. Unlike the uses and trusts article, §§ 38 and 39 of the court of chancery
article included personal property trusts as well as real property trusts.
18. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See also E. GRISWOLD, supra note 1, §70.
19. See supra note 10.
20. See Powell & Whiteside, supra note 9, at 118.
21. See E. GRISWOLD. supra note 1, § 70.

Spendthrift Trusts in Washington
Thorn.22 The Williams court limited the protections offered to beneficiaries by the court of chancery sections to that amount necessary for the
support of the income beneficiary. 23 Further, the court held that the creditor could reach accruing future income as well as present income that
exceeded the amount necessary for the beneficiary's support. 24 Thus, the
New York Court of Appeals curbed the broad debtor protections in the
court of chancery statute by reading a creditor-oriented meaning into section 57.25

3.

Washington LegislationRegarding SpendthriftTrusts

a. The Selective 1893 Legislation
In 1893, the Washington legislature enacted a statute 26 modeled after
the court of chancery article discussed above. 27 The Washington legisla22. 70 N.Y. 270 (1877). In Williams, the court applied § 57 in an action by a judgment creditor
brought after an execution was returned unsatisfied, and the court refused to bar the creditor's attempt
to reach the judgment debtor's trust interest under the court of chancery provisions. Id. at 276-77.
23.
d.at 278.
24. Id. at 279-80.
25. See E. GRIsWoLD, supra note 1, § 70. After the revised statutes of 1828 were enacted, the
New York legislature twice extended the ability of creditors to reach a debtor's trust interest. First,
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 5205(d) (Consol. 1978 & Supp. 1982) allows a judgment creditor to reach at
least 10% of the income of a non-self-settled trust, and more than 10% if the court determines that the
judgment debtor reasonably needs less than 90% of the trust income. See In re Dolard, 275 F. Supp.
1001 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Hamilton v. Drogo, 241 N.Y. 401, 150 N.E. 496 (1926) (applying the same
statute in its earlier form, § 684 of the New York Civil Practice Act, to the Duke of Manchester's
income interest in a trust).
Second, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5226 (Consol. 1978) authorizes New York courts to order judgment debtors to make installment payments to judgment creditors upon a showing by the creditor that
the debtor is or will be receiving money from any source. The statute directs the courts to take a
variety of factors into consideration in fixing the amounts of the installment payments, including the
reasonable needs of the judgment debtor and his dependents, the amount due on the judgment, and
the amount of money the debtor is receiving. See generally E. GRISWOLD, supranote 1, §§ 71-71.2; 2
A. Scarr,supranote 1, § 152.1.
26. Act of March 15, 1893, ch. 133, § 25, 1893 Wash. Laws 435, 441 (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE §6.32.250 (1981)). See supra note 4.
27. See supra note 8. The New York and Washington statutes were originally enacted in different legislative contexts. Sections 38 and 39 of the court of chancery portion of the New York statutes
appear in a portion of the code that deals with the general powers, duties, and jurisdiction of the court
of chancery. The two sections authorize the court of chancery to compel discovery and decree satisfaction on a judgment debt where the creditor has sued out an execution on the debt and had it returned unsatisfied. On the other hand, WASH. REv. CODE § 6.32.250 was originally enacted as part of
a chapter entitled "Proceedings Supplemental to Execution." Act of March 15, 1893, ch. 133, § 25,
1893 Wash. Laws 435,441. This chapter had a function similar to the New York court of chancery
statutes, but arose in a different legislative context.
Under WASH. REv. CODE § 6.32.010, these proceedings supplemental to execution are authorized
within ten years after entry of a judgment for the sum of twenty-five dollars or more. Their purpose is
to make the judgment debtor disclose "the extent and whereabouts of his or her property and, if
possible, to enable the judgment creditor to locate nonexempt property belonging to the judgment
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ture did not, however, enact a provision analogous to section 57 of New
York's uses and trusts statute, which allows creditors to reach the beneficiary's surplus income. As a result, no Washington court has been able to
limit the broad restrictions on involuntary alienation as the Williams v.
Thorn court did, and all Washington trusts that are not self-settled be-

come spendthrift trusts as to involuntary alienation. 28 One commentator
has concluded that the legislature's adoption of section 6.32.250 must
29
have been inadvertent.
In effect, section 6.32.250 prohibits the involuntary alienation of all
property held in trust for the judgment debtor unless the trust is self-set-

tled. 30 The statute favors beneficiaries of all trusts that are not self-settled,
including those in which the settlor intentionally omitted a spendthrift
clause. The statute thereby limits the rights of creditors.
b.

Subsequent Legislation RegardingSpendthrift Trusts

In 1951, the Washington legislature enacted section 30.30.120 of the
31
Washington Revised Code to limit the broad scope of section 6.32.250.
This new provision states that section 6.32.250 does not prevent creditors

from reaching a beneficiary's interest to satisfy the beneficiary's debts for
necessities of life, to enforce a child support decree against him or her, or
to enforce a court order subjecting his or her vested remainder upon its
expiration to execution of the beneficiary's debts. This provision and secdebtor which may be applied on the debt." Rainier Nat'l Bank v. McCracken, 26 Wn. App. 498,
511, 615 P.2d 469, 477 (1980), review denied, 95 Wn. 2d 1005 (1981). Proceedings supplemental to
execution are intended to give a judgment creditor a means of satisfying his or her claim against the
judgment debtor in addition to the normal means of execution covered in WASH. REV CODE ch. 6.04
(1981). The statute authorizing proceedings supplemental to execution precludes the remedy by suit
in equity, and such proceedings are intended to serve the end of a creditor's bill. Knettle v. Knettle,
164 Wash. 468, 476, 3 P.2d 133, 136 (1931).
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 6.32.250 restricts only involuntary alienation of trust interests. Restrictions upon voluntary alienation are valid in Washington when imposed through an express spendthrift
provision. Milner v. Outcalt, 36 Wn. 2d 720, 722, 219 P.2d 982, 984 (1950). See infra notes 33-36
and accompanying text.
29. See E. GRISWOLD. supra note 1, § 230.
30. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Crosby, 42 Wn. 2d 234, 243, 254 P.2d 732, 738 (1953); see also
Wicker, supra note 1, at 7-8.
31. WASH REV. CODE § 30.30.120 (1981) (originally appearing in Act of Mar. 17, 1951, ch.
226, 1951 Wash. Laws 696). The statute reads as follows:
Nothing in RCW 6.32.250 shall forbid execution upon the income of any trust created by a
person other than the judgment debtor for debt arising through the furnishing of the necessities
of life to the beneficiary of such trust; or as to such income forbid the enforcement of any order
of the superior court requiring the payment of support for the children under the age of eighteen
of any beneficiary; or forbid the enforcement of any order of the superior court subjecting the
vested remainder of any such trust upon its expiration to execution for the debts of the remainderman.
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tion 19.36.020 of the Code, which provides that an individual cannot create a spendthrift trust for himself, are the main statutory limitations upon
section 6.32.250.32
B.

JudicialInterpretationof Section 6.32.250

1. The Validity ofExpress and Statutory Spendthrift Trusts
Milner v. Outcalt33 was the first Washington Supreme Court decision
to recognize the validity of express spendthrift trusts. In Milner, the court
upheld an express spendthrift provision as a valid restraint on the voluntary alienation of both the income and principal interests of the trust. 34
Further, the court held that the plaintiff could not obtain a judgment in
rem against the defendant-beneficiary's property because the property
was not subject to a proceeding under section 6.32.250. 35 The court concluded that the express spendthrift trust had the same spendthrift characteristics as statutory spendthrift trusts under section 6.32.250.36 Although
the state supreme court subsequently determined that the statutory
spendthrift characteristics do not apply to express spendthrift trusts, 37 express and statutory spendthrift trusts have similar characteristics, barring
38
statutory modification.
Trusts with no express spendthrift provision are treated as spendthrift
trusts, as far as judgment creditors are concerned, by virtue of section
6.32.250 and Seattle FirstNationalBank v. Crosby.39 Crosby was a de32. See Wicker, supra note 1, at 9.
33. 36 Wn. 2d 720,219 P.2d 982(1950).
34. Id. at 722, 219 P.2d at 984. The spendthrift provision in the trust before the court in Milner
purported only to restrict voluntary alienation by the trust beneficiaries. Presumably, express
spendthrift provisions which also purported to restrict involuntary alienation would also be upheld if
WASH. REV. CODE § 6.32.250 applied, unrestricted by the limitations imposed by WASH. REV. CODE
§ 30.30.120. This presumption was affirmed by the Washington Supreme Court in Erickson v. Bank
of California, 97 Wn. 2d 246, 643 P.2d 670 (1982). For a full discussion of the Erickson case, see
infra part IB3b.
35. 36 Wn. 2d at 722-23, 219 P.2d at 984 (applying WASH. REV. CODE § 6.32.250 to the plaintiff's attempt to garnish defendant's trust income).
36. Id. at 723, 219 P.2d at 984. The Milner court relied on two prior Washington cases that dealt
with trusts lacking express spendthrift provisions, but to which WASH. REV. CODE § 6.32.250 applied, to determine the ability of the plaintiff to reach the beneficiary's interest in the express spendthrift trust. The court relied upon Knettle v. Knettle, 197 Wash. 225, 84 P.2d 996 (1938), for the
holding that "[only that part of the trust income which has accrued and is ready for distribution to the
beneficiary, is subject to seizure." Milner v. Outcalt, 36 Wn. 2d at 723, 219 P.2d at 984. The court
also cited Cowles v. Matthews, 197 Wash. 652, 86 P.2d 273 (1939), for the holding that "[t]he
corpus of the trust cannot be reached to satisfy a judgment." Milner v. Outcalt, 36 Wn. 2d at 723,
219 P.2d at 984.
37. Erickson v. Bank of California, 97 Wn. 2d 246, 251,643 P.2d 670,673 (1982).
38. One such statutory modification is WASH. REV. CODE § 30.30.120. See supra note 31.
39. 42 Wn. 2d 234, 254 P.2d 732 (1953). Crosby did not involve claims made by judgment
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claratory judgment action brought by the trustee of a trust for support to
determine the validity of the beneficiary's assignment of portions of the
trust income to his ex-wife and children pursuant to a settlement contract
in a California divorce decree. The Crosby court stated: "[I]t cannot be
denied that the practical effect of the statute has been to clothe every active trust with some statutory spendthrift provisions, at least in so far as
attempts by creditors of a beneficiary to reach his interest by legal process
40
are concerned. "
2.

Effect of Section 6.32.250 on JudgmentDebtors' Trust Interests

a.

The Knettle Line of Cases

In Knettle v. Knettle,4 1 the Washington Supreme Court held that under
section 6.32.250 a judgment creditor could not reach the debtor's beneficial interest either in trust principal or in future, unaccrued trust income. 42
The 1931 case was the first of four suits involving a trust settled by Nancy
A. Knettle. The trust contained no express spendthrift trust provision.
The plaintiff asserted a judgment lien against the defendant-beneficiary's
interest in the trust property in an attempt to satisfy a $10,000 judgment
against the defendant, her ex-husband. The court concluded that section
6.32.250 imposed statutory spendthrift restrictions on all trusts, and that
therefore involuntary alienation of a beneficiary's principal and unac43
crued future income was prohibited.
In the second Knettle case, 44 decided in 1937, the same plaintiff attempted to garnish trust income to satisfy a judgment debt owed by her
ex-husband, the beneficiary under the trust. The court held that "neither
the statute nor the [first Knettle] decision precludes the garnishment of
income in the hands of the trustees which has accrued and is ready for
45
distribution to the cestuis que trustent."
creditors, but rather by assignees of the beneficiary's interest. A strong parallel exists, however, in
that the Crosby court also decided the degree of protection afforded to the beneficiary of a trust with
restraints on alienation.
40. 42 Wn. 2d at 243,254 P.2d at 738.
41.

164 Wash. 468, 3 P.2d 133 (1931).

42.

Id. at 481,3 P.2d at 138.

43. This holding was later affirmed in Cowles v. Matthews, 197 Wash. 653, 86 P.2d 273 (1939),
and in B.F. Goodrich v. Thrash, 15 Wn. 2d 624, 131 P.2d 734 (1942). This is the majority position

in states that recognize the validity of spendthrift trusts. See 2 A. Scorr. supra note 1,§ 152.5;
RESTATEMENT. supra note 1, §§ 152-53.

44. Knettle v. Knettle. 190 Wash. 395, 68 P.2d 218 (1937).
45. Id. at 401, 68 P.2d at 220. This result conflicts with the majority rule, which is that a creditor
cannot reach the beneficiary's income interest until it is actually paid over by the trustee to the beneficiary. See E. GRISWOLD. supra note 1. § 369; RESTATEMENT. supra note t,§ 152 comment h.
After distinguishing the passive trust funds which the trustee had already prepared for payment

Spendthrift Trusts in Washington
In 1938, the court faced litigation involving the Knettle trust for a third
time. 46 The court indicated that the ultimate facts were essentially the
same as those of the 1937 decision, 47 but its reasoning differed substantially from the prior year.
The 1938 Knettle court first stated that section 6.32.250's purpose is
not to shield beneficiaries of trust estates from the payment of their
debts, 48 even though under the court's holding that remained the effect of
the statute. The court explained that the statute is designed to prevent
interference in the trustee's management of trust estates by creditors of
beneficiaries. 49 The court concluded that the statute therefore applied
only to active trusts because a passive trust does not require any management by the trustee. 50 And because the court stated it was considering a
passive trust, it refused to apply the statute in spite of unambiguous language.
After the Knettle decisions, 5 1 the effect and policy of section 6.32.250
remained unclear, and conflicted with pro-creditor policies advanced by
the courts. Unfortunately, the contradictions have not yet been resolved,
from the active trust funds which had not yet been prepared, the court concluded that the passive
funds were no longer subject to the statutory spendthrift provision and allowed the plaintiff to reach
the passive funds in partial satisfaction of her claims. 190 Wash. at 400-01, 68 P.2d at 220.
The 1937 Knettle court incorrectly labeled the accrued income ready for distribution a dry or passive trust. A passive trust is one in which the trustee is not required to do any positive act, so that the
trustee has no affirmative duty to perform to carry out the purpose of the settlor. See BoGERT, supra
note 1, § 206. A trust is active if the trustee has affirmative duties to perform under the terms of the
trust. See RESTATEmENT, supranote 1, § 69 comment a. Under these definitions, the Knettle trust was
an active trust. Further, the accrued income in the trustee's hands prior to distribution also constituted
active trust income, since the trustee had duties remaining to be performed-specifically, the payment of the income to the beneficiaries.
The consequence of the active/passive trust distinction made by the Knettle court was to require a
judgment creditor to bring a separate garnishment proceeding every time that income accrued in the
trustee's hands. This result was time-consuming, inconvenient, and expensive. Further, the result
partially defeated the original purpose of making the distinction, since it required the creditor to
spend money on garnishment proceedings every time that she wanted to reach the beneficiary's interest in partial satisfaction of her claim. Today, courts may solve the problem that faced the Knettle
court more adequately and directly by relying on WASH. REv. CODE § 30.30.120 or RESTATEmENT,
supra note 1, § 157. See infra note 88.
46. Knettle v. Knettle, 197 Wash. 225, 84 P.2d 996 (1938). In this case, the same plaintiff sued
the assignee of her ex-husband's interest in the Knettle trust to collect on her debt. As in the 1937
Knettle decision, the court held that a judgment creditor may reach a judgment debtor's income interest when the income is accrued in the trustee's hands awaiting distribution. Id. at 229, 84 P.2d at 998.
47. Id. at 227, 84 P.2d at 997.
48. Id. at 228, 84 P.2d at 997.
49. Id. at 228, 84 P.2d at 998. For a criticism of the court's analysis, see infra partIID2.
50. Id. For a criticism of the court's holding that the trust was a passive trust, see supranote 45
and infra note 88.
51. The final Knettle decision, Knettle v. Kennett, 12 Wn. 2d 261, 121 P.2d 343 (1942), broke
no new ground; it merely clarified a point raised in the 1938 Knettle decision involving the court's
mechanics in applying the court's active/passive distinction.
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and a recent decision shows that the effect of section 6.32.250 is still

unclear.
b.

Erickson v. Bank of California

In 1982 the Washington Supreme Court held in Erickson v. Bank of
California52 that a trustee in bankruptcy could reach a bankrupt's interest
in a trust in order to satisfy a creditor's claims for necessities of life despite an express spendthrift clause and despite section 6.32.250. 53 George
Schafer, a codefendant in the suit, filed a petition for bankruptcy. 54 He
was one beneficiary of a spendthrift testamentary trust settled by his

mother for her children's support. 55 The trustee in bankruptcy filed suit
against Schafer and the cotrustees of the trust after the cotrustees refused
52. 97 Wn. 2d 246, 643 P.2d 670 (1982).
53. Id. at 254, 643 P.2d at 674. The supreme court remanded the case for a determination of
whether the trustee in bankruptcy was asserting a claim for necessities of life. Id.
54. Appellant's brief to the court of appeals states that Schafer owed approximately $7900 to a
variety of creditors. Brief of Appellant at 5, Erickson v. Bank of California, 97 Wn. 2d 246, 643
P.2d 670 (1982). The debts were owed for, among other items, the services of a physician; ambulance service; water, power, gas, oil, and telephone service; and emergency hospital service. Id.
55. Pertinent portions of the trust instrument stated:
The Co-Trustees shall use so much of the net income and principal of the trust estate or the
remainder thereof as in their sole discretion is necessary for the maintenance, support and education of each living child ....
If at any time the Co-Trustees, in their judgment, after taking into consideration all other
resources, if any, which may then be known to the Co-Trustees to be available for each child,
deems any child over twenty-two (22) years of age to be in need of maintenance, support and
education, the Co-Trustees, in their discretion, may pay to or use for the benefit of such child so
much of the trust estate then remaining as the Co-Trustees deem advisable for such needs ....
At such time as all of my children shall attain the age of twenty-two (22) years, my CoTrustees shall . . . divide the trust estate then remaining into equal shares, one share for each
then living child, and one share for each then deceased child having then living child or children.
Such share shall ... constitute separate trusts and shall be held, paid, and distributed ....
Thereafter, when such child attains twenty-seven (27) years of age, the then remaining balance of the trust estate, principal accrued income, if any, shall be distributed to such child ....
The beneficial interest (in principal or income hereunder) of any beneficiary hereof shall not
be subject to claims of the respective beneficiary's creditors or others, nor to legal process, and
shall not be voluntarily or involuntarily assigned, alienated or encumbered ....
97 Wn. 2d at 248 & n. 1,249,643 P.2d at 671 & n. 1,672.
Under the terms of the trust, trustees were to provide the beneficiaries with income from the trust as
needed for their support, maintenance, and education until all beneficiaries reached age 22. The trustees were directed to distribute the corpus of the trust to the beneficiaries in equal shares once all the
beneficiaries reached age 22. George Schafer filed his bankruptcy petition six months and six days
before the youngest beneficiary would reach age 22. Id. at 249, 643 P.2d at 672. Had Schafer waited
seven more days before filing his petition, the trustee in bankruptcy could have reached Schafer's
trust interest regardless of the nature of the creditor's claims. II U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976) (current
version at 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981)) (bankruptcy estate includes an interest in property
that the debtor becomes entitled to acquire within 180 days after filing the petition for bankruptcy).
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him an accounting. 56 The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment granted to the cotrustees by the trial court. 57 The supreme court
58
modified the lower court decision and remanded the case.
The Erickson court decided two major issues. First, it held that an express spendthrift provision in a trust instrument is a valid restraint on
alienation. 59 Second, it ruled that the beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust may be reached by a trustee in bankruptcy to satisfy debts for
60
necessities of life.
In deciding the second issue, the court resolved a variety of subissues.
The most important of these was its holding that section 30.30.120 of the
Washington Revised Code, which in some circumstances allows creditors
to reach a beneficiary's trust interest despite section 6.32.250, does not
61
apply to express spendthrift trusts.
56. 97Wn. 2dat247,643 P.2d at 671.
57. Erickson v. Bank of California, 28 Wn. App. 337, 346,623 P.2d 721,726-27 (1981), modified on appeal, 97 Wn. 2d 246, 643 P.2d 670 (1982).
58. 97 Wn. 2d at 254, 643 P.2d at 675. The decision was unanimous and en banc.
59. Id. at 250, 643 P.2d at 672. The court relied upon Milner v. Outcalt, 36 Wn. 2d 720, 219
P.2d 982 (1950). See supranotes 33-36 and accompanying text.
60. 97 Wn. 2d at 254, 643 P.2d at 674.
61. Id. at 251,643 P.2d at 673. The court also decided two other subissues that are important to
this Comment. First, it concluded that the rights, remedies, and powers of the trustee in bankruptcy
as a hypothetical lien creditor under § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (Supp. V 1981)), are governed by state law. 97 Wn. 2d at 252,
643 P.2d at 673. That section of the Bankruptcy Act states:
The trustee shall have as of the date of bankruptcy the rights and powers of: (1) a creditor who
obtained a judgment against the bankrupt upon the date of bankruptcy, whether or not such a
creditor exists, (2) a creditor who upon the date of bankruptcy obtained an execution returned
unsatisfied against the bankrupt, whether or not such a creditor exists, and (3) a creditor who
upon the date of bankruptcy obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings upon all property,
whether or not coming into possession or control of the court, upon which a creditor of the
bankrupt upon a simple contract could have obtained such a lien, whether or not such a creditor
exists.
On the other subissue, the court held that the beneficiary's trust interest could be reached whether
or not the cotrustees otherwise had discretion to withhold payment to the beneficiary. 97 Wn. 2d at
253, 643 P.2d at 674. The supreme court determined that the court of appeals incorrectly applied an
overly strict standard taken from In re Estate of Dodge, 281 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1979) (qualifying
RESTATEMENT, supranote 1, § 157(b) by holding a trustee in bankruptcy could reach the assets only if
the debt was for necessities and if the trustee had no discretion but to furnish the necessity to or for the
beneficiary). In rejecting the Dodge holding, the Washington court applied the § 157(b) standard and
stated that "[s]uppliers of necessary goods and services to the beneficiary should be able to reach the
beneficiary's interest in the trust, whether or not the withholding of payment is properly within the
discretion of the cotrustees." 97 Wn. 2d at 253, 643 P.2d at 674.
This statement implies that Washington courts will consider discretionary trusts as failing within
RESTATEMENT, supra note I, § 157(b) for the purposes of protecting certain creditors. A purely discretionary trust is one by the terms of which a beneficiary is entitled to receive only that income or
principal which the trustee, in his uncontrolled discretion, sees fit to pay over. 2 A. ScoTT, supra note
1, § 155. Discretionary trusts are to be distinguished from spendthrift trusts and trusts for-support,
because the nature of the beneficiary's interest is different. RESTATEMETrr, supra note 1, § 155 comment b. However, since voluntary and involuntary alienation is also forbidden with respect to dis-
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The supreme court rejected the argument that section 30.30.120 should
be applied to allow the trustee in bankruptcy to reach Schafer's vested
remainder in the spendthrift trust. The supreme court stated only that,
lacking any indication that section 30.30.120 was meant to restrict the
common law regarding spendthrift trusts, it did not apply to a trust with
62
an express spendthrift provision.
The court accepted the argument that a trustee in bankruptcy should be
able to reach the bankrupt's interest in the express spendthrift trust because a creditor who furnishes necessities of life may reach an interest in
the express spendthrift trust. 63 In so ruling, the court agreed that section
70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act was controlling, and therefore the trustee in
bankruptcy could "step into the shoes" of the hypothetical lien creditor
described in that section. 64 Since the court decided that a creditor who
furnished necessities of life could reach the bankrupt's interest in the express spendthrift trust, it followed that a trustee in bankruptcy with a
claim for necessities of life could also reach the bankrupt's trust interest.
C.

Summary

The history behind the enactment of section 6.32.250 explains the
broad scope of the statute's coverage, but it does not explain why the
statute was enacted. Section 30.30.120, which allows certain favored
creditors to reach trust interests on policy grounds, has limited the types
of creditors to which section 6.32.250 applies. Further, several court decisions, holding that the statute does not apply to both passive trusts and
express spendthrift trusts, have successfully limited the sweeping coverage of section 6.32.250 to certain types of trusts. These decisions, however, contain conceptual errors and inconsistencies, and they present
cretionary trusts, it is reasonable that the Washington court would choose to treat certain favored
creditors in the same way under all three types of trusts.
62. Erickson v. Bank of California, 97 Wn. 2d at 251,643 P.2d at 673.
63. Id. The court relied on RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 157(b); BOGERT, supra note 1, § 224;
and the 1938 Knettle decision, 197 Wash. 225, 84 P.2d 996, for this proposition. Erickson v. Bank of
California, 97 Wn. 2d at 252, 643 P.2d at 673.
64. Erickson v. Bank of California, 97 Wn. 2d at 253,643 P.2d at 673. There is much authority
for creating this legal fiction in favor of general judgment creditors. See, e.g., In re Irving Trust Co.,
267 N.Y. 102, 195 N.E. 811 (1935), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 296 U.S. 539 (1935) (trustee in bankruptcy granted status of judgment creditor by Bankruptcy Act may garnish trust income);
Sarver v. Towne, 285 N.Y. 264, 34 N.E.2d 313 (1941) (same). The court could not find any specific
authority for employing the fiction in the case of a creditor who provided the debtor with necessities
of life. However, the policy that allows a general creditor to "step into the shoes" applies equally, if
not more strongly, to creditors with claims for supplying necessities, and would-be recipients of child
support and alimony. The implicit policy judgment is that special creditors should take priority over
general creditors.
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problems to the practicing attorney who needs to determine the state of
this area of law.
II.

PROBLEMS WITH WASHINGTON'S STATUTORY
SPENDTHRIFT PROVISION

The conflict between the language of section 6.32.250 and the policy
of the Erickson and Knettle courts to allow some creditors to reach
spendthrift trust assets has created many problems. Section 6.32.250
turns all trusts that are not self-settled into spendthrift trusts as to judgment creditors. These blanket debtor protections conflict with the strong
policies underlying many Washington statutes 65 and some Washington
Supreme Court decisions dealing with the creditor-debtor relationship.
A.

Unduly BroadDebtorProtections

The wide scope of section 6.32.250-even as limited by section
30.30.120 of the Code-offers overly broad protection to debtors. Under
section 6.32.250, a creditor may be prevented from reaching the trust
interest of a wealthy beneficiary-debtor even when the settlor does not
restrict involuntary alienation under the trust. This injustice is best illustrated by Hardenburghv. Blair,6 6 a case decided under a New Jersey statute almost identical to section 6.32.250.67 In Hardenburgh, the court
held that the New Jersey statute barred a creditor's attempt to reach the
income of a $250,000 trust in satisfaction of his claim. 68 An equally unjust result is possible today in Washington if the creditor's claims do not
fall within the relatively narrow categories listed in section 30.30.120.
Hardenburgh demonstrates that it is not in the public interest to afford
statutory protections to debtors who do not need them.
B.

Conflict With CurrentLegislative Policy

The Washington legislature's enactment of section 6.32.250 in 1893
has never been adequately justified. In the absence of pertinent legislative
65. See infra part IIB.
66. 30 N.J. Eq. 645 (1879).
67. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2:29-110, 2:29-111 (West 1937) (repealed 1951).
68. 30 N.J. Eq. at 665-67. In concluding, the court stated:
Whether, upon considerations of public policy, property to so large an amount as that involved in this suit, should be enjoyed by a debtor without liability for the payment of his debts,
is not a matter of judicial cognizance. That subject must be left within the discretion of the
legislature for its regulation, if it seems politic or judicious to do so.
Id. at 667.
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history, it appears that the drafters of the original Washington legislation

either misunderstood its spendthrift consequences or mistakenly adopted
the statute without simultaneously limiting its scope. 69 Whatever its origi-

nal justification, section 6.32.250 is inconsistent with contemporary
Washington legislative policies regarding the creditor-debtor relationship.
Washington policy concerning the respective rights of creditors and
debtors is found in statutes regarding exemptions from execution, the
homestead laws, and wage garnishments. In general, these statutes limit
the reach of creditors only to the extent necessary to permit the debtor to

retain certain essentials necessary for survival.
Execution of judgments is dealt with in chapter 6.04 of the Washington
Revised Code. Section 6.04.060 states that: "All property, real and personal, of the judgment debtor, not exempted by law, shall be liable to
execution." 70 Chapter 6.16 specifies certain property exempted by law
from execution. 7 1 Included are exemptions for wearing apparel, beds,
certain household goods and furniture, and various essentials necessary to

72
tradespersons or professionals for the performance of their occupations.

These exemptions all reflect a general concern that debtors, while responsible for their debts, should be allowed to retain some means of sustenance.

Execution exemption statutes have four fundamental aims. They are
intended to protect the debtor, the debtor's family, society, and the creditor. 73 Washington courts have long recognized the first three aims, but
have repeatedly stated that exemption statutes limit the rights of creditors.74 It may be argued that such statutes indirectly protect creditors as
well, however, because they allow debtors to maintain some productive
capacity.75
69. This conclusion seems logical because the effect of the corresponding court of chancery sections of the New York statute was contrary to the stated purpose of the statute's drafters. See supra
notes 13-15 and accompanying text, and E.GRISWOLD. supra note 1,§ 70.
70. WASH. REV CODE §6.04.060 (1981).
71. WASH. REV CODE ch. 6.16. See generally Rombauer, Debtors' Exemption Statutes-Revision Ideas, 36 WASH. L. REV 484 (1961).
72. WASH. REV- CODE § 6.16.020 (1981). In addition, there are provisions for the exemption of
federal government pensions, id. §§ 6.16.030, 6.16.040; fire insurance money on exempt property,
id. § 6.16.050; separate property of the wife, id. § 6.16.070; unemployment compensation benefits,
id. § 50.40.020; proceeds from disability insurance, id. § 48.18.400, life insurance, id. § 48.18.410,
and group life insurance, id. § 48.18.420; annuity proceeds, id. § 48.18.430; volunteer firefighter
benefits, id. § 41.24.240; teacher retirement benefits, id. § 41.32.590; and state employee retirement
benefits, id. §§ 41.40.380, 41.44.240.
73. Rombauer, supra note 71, at 486. For a general treatment of execution exemptions in this
country, see S. RIESENFELD. CREDITORS- REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION ch. 4 (3d ed. 1979).
74. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Tiffany, 40 Wn. 2d 193, 202,242 P.2d 169, 173 (1952).
75. See Rombauer, supra note 71, at 486.
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The Washington homestead law, found in chapter 6.12 of the Code, 76
is based on considerations similar to those underlying the execution exemptions. Its particular concern, however, is with preserving real property for the use and well-being of its occupants. 77 In Washington, homesteads are subject to execution in only two instances: to satisfy judgments
obtained on debts secured by various liens upon the premises, and to satisfy judgments secured by mortgages on the premises. 78
Finally, section 7.33.280 exempts certain wages from garnishment. 79
Wage exemptions are granted for the purpose of allowing the defendant to
preserve a means of sustaining himself or herself and his or her family.
In contrast, section 6.32.250 serves only one aim: protecting the
debtor. Section 6.32.250 does not fulfill the policies of protecting the
debtor's family, society, or the creditor that are reflected in the statutes
discussed above. The debtor's family is hot protected by the statute if he
or she is able to pay the debt without financially endangering his or her
family. Society is not protected, either, if the debtor-beneficiary has sufficient means of support separate from the trust fund. In fact, society may
be harmed, because section 6.32.250 produces uncertainty for creditors
and undeserved wealth for debtors. Finally, creditors certainly are not
protected, because .while section 6.32.250 allows the beneficiary to retain
funds and therefore some productive capacity, it prohibits creditors from
76. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 6.12 (1981). Homesteads are described as follows:
The homestead consists of the dwelling house or the mobile home in which the owner resides,
with appurtenant buildings, and the land on which the same are situtated, and by which the same
are surrounded, or land without improvements purchased with the intention of building a house
and residing thereon.
Id. § 6.12.010.
If the owner is married, the homestead may consist of the community property or the separate
property of either spouse: provided, That the same premises may not be claimed separately by
the husband and wife with the effect of increasing the net value of the homestead available to the
marital community beyond the amount specified in RCW 6.12.050 [$20,000 maximum as of
1983] as now or hereafter amended. When the owner is not married, the homestead may consist
of any of his or her property.
Id. § 6.12.020.
77. One court has stated:
The homestead exemption statutes were enacted pursuant to Const. art. 19, § 1, for the purpose of providing a shelter for the family and an exemption for a home. The homestead statutes
are favored in the law and should be liberally construed. They do not protect the rights of creditors; rather, they are in derogation of such rights.
Bank of Anacortes v. Cook, 10 Wn. App. 391, 395, 517 P.2d 633, 636 (1974) (citations omitted).
78. WASH. REv. CODE § 6.12.100 (1981). Homesteads are also subject to execution to satisfy
judgments secured by purchase money security agreements describing a mobile home as collateral.
Id.
79. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.33.280(1) (1981). The statute exempts from garnishment the largest of
the three following amounts: 40 times the state hourly minimum wage; 75% of the defendant's disposable earnings, or such amount as may be exempt under federal law.
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reaching funds in excess of the amount required for the beneficiary's support.
C.

Conflict Between Section 6.32.250 and the Rationalefor Spendthrift
Trusts

Section 6.32.250 is not only inconsistent with Washington's general
creditor-debtor policies; it also is not supported by the rationale of
spendthrift trusts. 8 0 Spendthrift trusts allow the settlor (1) to dispose of
property as he or she wishes, 8 1 and (2) to protect the trust beneficiaries
from the hardships of life. 82 A statutory spendthrift trust serves neither
purpose. First, alienability of the beneficiary's equitable trust interest
should be limited only if the settlor's intent to do so is explicit. Washington courts have long recognized that the sole object in construing trust
instruments is to ascertain and effectuate the settlor's intent insofar as it is
consistent with the rules of law. 83 A statutory spendthrift trust ignores the
importance of the settlor's intent. Second, because wealthy trust beneficiaries will never be subjected to the vicissitudes of life, a statute which
protects these beneficiaries from nonexistent hardships at the expense of
creditors is unfair.
D.

Avoidance of Section 6.32.250 by the Courts

The broad scope of section 6.32.250 has caused problems for Washington courts when its application would lead to inequitable results. Consequently, Washington courts have consistently avoided or interpreted
around the statute. The Knettle and Erickson cases show how the Washington Supreme Court has circumvented the statute.
1.

The 1937 Knettle Decision

Equitable considerations apparently led the 1937 Knettle court to hold
that income accrued in the trustee's hands awaiting distribution to the
beneficiary was subject to seizure by creditors. 84 In 1929, Melcena Knet-

80.

See BOGERT. supra note 1, § 222; Note, A Rationalefor the Spendthrift Trust, 64 COLUM. L.

REV. 1323 (1964).

81. See BOGERT. supra note 1, § 222.
82. Id.
83. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Crosby, 42 Wn. 2d 234, 254 P.2d 732 (1953); Old Nat'l Bank &
Union Trust Co. v. Hughes, 16 Wn. 2d 584, 134 P.2d 63 (1943); Old Nat'l Bank v. Campbell, I Wn.
App. 773, 463 P.2d 656 (1970).
84. 190 Wash. at 401, 68 P.2d at 220. The court relied upon three out-of-state decisions as
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tle, the plaintiff, obtained a divorce decree against Lemyrt Knettle, the
defendant, and was awarded custody of their three young children. One
year later, the defendant stopped making monthly support and maintenance payments, and assigned his trust interest to his future wife. 85 The
court decided that Lemyrt Knettle had attempted to escape responsibility
for the maintenance and support of his children, 86 and had fraudulently
conveyed his trust interest to his future wife. 87
After finding the conveyance fraudulent, the court had to decide
whether the plaintiff-creditor could reach the defendant-debtor's interest
in a statutory spendthrift trust. Despite section 6.32.250, the court allowed the plaintiff to reach the trust interest in partial satisfaction of her
child support claim. The court justified its decision with the inaccurate
statement that trust income accrued in the trustee's hands awaiting distri88
bution constituted a passive trust.
2.

The 1938 Knettle Decision

The 1938 Knettle court went even further in circumventing section
6.32.250. Rather than limiting the circumstances in which the statute
might be applied, in 1938 the court read an unwarranted legislative purpose into the statute to justify its creditor-oriented results. The court
stated that section 6.32.250 was designed to prevent creditors from interauthority for its holding. The court apparently set out to reach a result that would "do justice," even
though it placed Washington within a distinct minority of jurisdictions on this point.
85. Id. at 396-97, 68 P.2d at 218-19.
86. Id. at 399, 68 P.2d at 219-20.
87. Id. Because the trust did not contain an express spendthrift clause, finding that the plaintiff
could reach the defendant's trust interest was an easy task for the court. Since Mrs. Knettle did not
include an express spendthrift provision in her trust instrument, the court likely assumed that she did
not intend the trust interests to be restricted by spendthrift restrictions. This is particularly probable
because when the trust was settled in 1928, no Washington cases interpreting the effect of WASH.
REv. CODE § 6.32.250 had yet appeared, and its coverage and effect were even more uncertain than
they are today. See Laucks v. Princehouse, 13 Wn. 2d 140, 152, 124 P.2d 226, 231 (1942).
88. The artificial and erroneous active/passive distinction drawn by the 1937 Knettle court almost
certainly would not be applied by a Washington court today. The court apparently drew the false
distinction in order to allow the needy plaintiff to reach the defendant's trust interest in partial satisfaction of her child support claim. The passage of WASH. REv. CODE § 30.30.120 has eliminated the
need for this distinction. That statute allows a creditor with a child support claim to reach a beneficiary's trust interest despite WASH. REv. CODE § 6.32.250.
In addition, after Ericksonv. Bank of California, Washington courts will probably rely on § 157(a)
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS to allow a plaintiff to satisfy a support or alimony claim by
reaching a beneficiary's interest in an express spendthrift trust. In Erickson, the court applied only §
157(b) of the RESTATEMENT, which deals with a creditor's claim for necessary supplies or services,
but similar policy reasons should certainly persuade the court to apply § 157(a) when the situation
comes before the court. Thus, the active/passive trust distinction made by the Knettle court is no
longer necessary, and the erroneous distinction should not be followed in the future.
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fering in trust management, 89 and therefore allowed the creditor to reach
undistributed "passive" funds that supposedly required no more trustee
management. 90 The language of the statute, however, indicates that this
could not have been the legislature's purpose.
The court incorrectly construed the word "interference" in the statute.
Section 6.32.250 prevents the "seizure of, or other interference with"
several types of property owned by judgment debtors. 91 These include
property exempt from execution, interests in non-self-settled trusts, and
certain earnings necessary for the support of the debtor's family. The statute's scope is unaccountably broad if its purpose is merely to prevent
creditors from interfering with the management of trusts. Furthermore,
the statute fails to mention trustees, the parties which the 1938 court intended to benefit with its construction of "interference." The statutory
language strongly suggests that the actual purpose of the statute is to protect the debtor's means of sustenance from the reach of creditors. The
1938 Knettle decision illustrates the conflict between the general policy of
the Washington courts regarding the reach of creditors and the language
of section 6.32.250.92
3.

Erickson v. Bank of California

Despite section 6.32.250, the Erickson court held that a bankruptcy
trustee could reach a bankrupt's interest in an express spendthrift trust to
satisfy a claim for necessities of life. 93 The court's statutory construction
and policy analysis were poorly reasoned.
The Erickson court limited the coverage of sections 6.32.250 and
30.30.120 by holding the latter inapplicable to an express spendthrift
trust. 94 Section 6.32.250, however, purports to cover all trusts, including
by implication those with an express spendthrift provision. 95 Because the
89. 197 Wash. at 228, 84 P.2d at 998.
90. Id. at 229, 84 P.2d at 998.
91. See supra note 4.
92. See supra part IIB.
93. 97 Wn.2d at 254, 643 P.2d at 674.
94. Id. at 251,643 P.2d at 673.
95. The statutory language supports the construction that such express spendthrift trusts are included: "This chapter does not authorize the seizure of, or other interference with, . . . any money,
thing in action or other property held in trust ...." WASH. REV. CODE § 6.32.250 (1981) (emphasis
added).
The court could have construed WASH. REV. CODE § 30.30.120 to mean that § 6.32.250 does not
forbid the enforcement of a superior court order subjecting a vested remainder in any trust to execution upon the trust's expiration. Under this interpretation § 30.30.120 would, upon expiration of the
trust, allow a creditor to enforce an order of execution upon the vested remainder of the trust, even if
it has an express spendthrift provision. By following this approach, the court could have reached the
same result.
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language of section 30.30.120 limits only the types of creditors, not the
types of trusts, to which section 6.32.250 applies, it should cover all
types of trusts covered by section 6.32.250. Therefore, section 30.30.120
should apply to express spendthrift trusts also.
The court's refusal to apply section 30.30.120 reflects a desire to limit
the broad scope of both section 6.32.250 and section 30.30.120.96 The
court could have allowed the trustee to get a portion of the trust income by
applying section 30.30.120. The court chose instead to decide the case
independently of the statute. As a result, the court limited section
30.30.120-and arguably section 6.32.250 as well-to those trusts that
do not contain an express spendthrift provision. This view of Erickson is
consistent with the treatment given the Knettle trust in the 1937 and 1938
Knettle decisions. In each case, the court's construction of a statute restricted its meaning and rendered it inapplicable to the case at hand. 97
The Erickson court emphasized that it had reached the only equitable
result. Any other result, the court said, would allow spendthrift trust beneficiaries to use section 6.32.250 as a tool to defraud creditors. 98 Erickson
illustrates that Washington courts will circumvent section 6.32.250 to
reach fair results. The statute's inequitable application to trusts should be
remedied by one of the methods suggested below.
III.

RECOGNIZING AND RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS WITH
SECTION 6.32.250

Section 6.32.250 currently poses problems because its purpose and application is uncertain and because its underlying policy is in conflict with
the policies of the legislature and the state supreme court. Modification of
The court of appeals did not follow this reasoning. Instead, it found no indication that § 30.30.120
was intended to restrict the common law as it relates to spendthrift trusts, and that express spendthrift
trusts fall within the common law rather than the scope of § 30.30.120. 28 Wn. App. at 343, 623
P.2d at 725.
96. Because WASH. REv. CODE § 30.30.120 was held inapplicable to an express spendthrift trust,
one may infer from the court's reasoning that WASH. REv. CODE § 6.32.250 is also inapplicable to
express spendthrift trusts. The history and interpretation of § 6.32.250 do not reveal that it was meant
to restrict the common law as it relates to spendthrift trusts.
97. Five of the seven major Washington spendthrift trust cases that have addressed WASH. REv.
CODE § 6.32.250 or § 30.30.120 have found the statute(s) to be inapplicable to the issue at hand
despite the apparent applicability of § 6.32.250 to all trusts. See supranotes 33-62 and accompanying text. Of the seven (the four Knettle cases, Milner, and the two Erickson decisions), only in Milner
and the first Knettle case did the court find the language of the statute applicable to the parties. See
supra notes 33-62 and accompanying text. While § 6.32.250 was held to apply to spendthrift trusts in
the three most recent Knettle cases, the court distinguished between active and passive trusts as a
means of avoiding the result of a literal application of the statute. See supranotes 42-51 and accompanying text.

98. 97 Wn. 2d at 254,643 P.2d at 675.
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the statute offers the best solution. Such a change would introduce predictability and uniformity to Washington statutory and case law on spendthrift trusts.
A.

Possible Legislative andJudicialModifications of Section 6.32.250

Five other states adopted statutes similar to section 6.32.250. These
statutes were also based upon the court of chancery provisions in the 1828
New York statutes. 99 An examination of the actions taken by the legislatures and courts of two of these states suggests options that the Washington legislature and courts might consider to ameliorate the problems
caused by section 6.32.250.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court alleviated the harsh effect of that
state's statute' 00 by holding that, while the statute bars a creditor's proceeding in equity, a creditor may reach a debtor's equitable interest with
an action at law. 10 1 This approach is similar to the steps taken by the
Washington court in the Knettle and Erickson cases to avoid the harsh
effect of the statute. 102 While such artificial distinctions allow the court to
circumvent the statute's undesirable effect, they create confusion in the
legal doctrine by straining the relationship of apparent legislative intentas indicated in the statutory language-and judicial interpretation.
New Jersey's legislature took two steps to deal with the unjust debtor
protections offered by that state's statute. 103 First, it limited to $4000 the

99. See ILL ANN. STAT ch. 22, § 49 (1968) (current version at ILL. ANN STAT. ch. 110, 12-1402
(Smith-Hurd 1983 Pamphlet)); NEv. REV. STAT. § 21.080 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 498:8, :9
(1968); N.J. STAT ANN §§ 2:29-110, -111 (West 1937) (repealed 1951); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-4101 (1980). See also E. GRISWOLD, supra note 1, § 78. The New Hampshire and New Jersey statutes
will be treated briefly infra. The Nevada, Illinois and Tennessee statutes will not be discussed.
100. N.H. REV STAT. ANN. §§ 498:8, :9 (1968).
101. Brahmey v. Rollins, 87 N.H. 290, 179 A. 186 (1935). This decision marked the first time a
court granted relief to a creditor in the presence of a statute based upon the New York chancery court
provisions. E. GRISWOLD. supra note 1, § 202. The court held that, although the suit brought as a
creditor's bill must be dismissed under the statute, the creditor's bill could be amended into an action
at law, with trustee process granted as a new attachment, available to reach funds of the debtor in the
fiduciary's possession. 179 A. at 195.
None of the other five jurisdictions that have enacted a similar form of the statute has sidestepped
the statute's harsh provisions by distinguishing between equitable proceedings and actions at law.
Washington has taken the opposite approach. In the first Knettle case, the Washington Supreme Court
held that the statute authorizing proceedings supplemental to execution (WASH. REV. CODE ch. 6.32)
was an exclusive equitable remedy in the form of a creditor's bill. Knettle v. Knettle, 164 Wash. 468,
476, 3 P.2d 133, 136 (1931).
102. See supra part lID.
103. N.J. STAT. ANN §§ 2:29-110, -I1
GRISWOLD, supra note 1, §§ 203-06.

850

(West 1937) (repealed 1951). See generally E.
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amount of income protected by the statute. 104 Later, the legislature
repealed the original law and replaced it with provisions enabling the
creditor to reach at least ten percent of the debtor's income. 105 Such statutory limitations are superior to the judicial limitations described above
because they provide doctrinal certainty and consistency. Nevertheless,
they only reduce the chance that a debtor-beneficiary will receive undeserved protection; trust interests up to the statutory limit will still be beyond the reach of creditors. Further, they still offer spendthrift protection
to trust beneficiaries whose settlors may have attempted to avoid spendthrift consequences by intentionally omitting spendthrift language from the
trust instrument.
B.

The Future of Section 6.32.250 in Washington

Washington courts have avoided section 6.32.250 and allowed certain
creditors to reach a beneficiary-debtor's trust interest when necessary to
reach a just result. The courts follow the policies implicit in section
30.30.120 and other statutes, rather than the debtor-oriented provision in
section 6.32.250. The results have been generally consistent with the majority of other jurisdictions. 106 After Erickson, the Washington Supreme
Court will not likely retreat from its pro-creditor stance and revert to use
of section 6.32.250 as a shelter for the interests of trust beneficiaries.
There are two possible solutions to the problems presented by section
6.32.250: amend the statute to modify its provisions regarding trusts, or
repeal its trust provisions altogether. In the interests of consistent policy
and legal clarity, the latter choice is preferable.
Under current law, a creditor without statutorily recognized "special"
status 07 is prevented from reaching the beneficiary's interest in a trust
even in the absence of a spendthrift provision. This inconsistent restriction of the creditor's reach, which may contradict the settlor's intent,1 08 is
104.

N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 2:29-113 (West

N.J. STAT. ANN.

§9 2A:17-50 to :17-56 (1952

§204.
105.

1937) (repealed 1951). See E. GRISWOLD, supranote 1,
& Supp. 1982). N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 2:29-113

was repealed in 1951 by the enactment of title 2A. The 10% allowance to creditors in the current

statute is similar to a provision in the New York statutes. See supranote 25.
106. The one exception is the holding in the 1937 Knettle case, where the court held that a
judgment debtor could reach funds accumulated in the trustee's hands and ready for distribution at a
date prior to the date of execution. See supranotes 44-45 and accompanying text.

107.

I.e., the claims listed in WAsH. REv. CODE § 30.30.120. See supranote 31.

108.

The statute will defeat the settlor's intent if the settlor attempted to allow involuntary alien-

ation by making no reference to its restriction in the trust instrument. Many settlors establish express
trusts with the assistance of counsel. Counsel could easily include a spendthrift clause in the trust
instrument if the settlor wished to restrain involuntary alienation. Presumably, attorneys would in-

clude an express spendthrift clause in a trust instrument rather than rely upon the uncertain effect of
WASH. REv. CODE

§ 6.32.250 to implement a settlor's

desire to prohibit the beneficiary's involuntary
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particularly egregious in the case of the wealthy beneficiary who uses section 6.32.250 as a means of avoiding creditors. The Erickson decision
cleared the way for the repeal of section 6.32.250 by holding section
30.30.120 inapplicable to express spendthrift trusts, 1 09 and by applying
the policies of section 30.30.120 on common law, not statutory, authority. 110 Thus, repeal of section 6.32.250 would not alter the law in Washington as it relates to express spendthrift trusts. By repealing the statute
now, the legislature could avoid further confusion, better effectuate the
intent of settlors, and remove a ninety-year-old statute that may have been
adopted by mistake. I"'
IV.

CONCLUSION

Washington courts have had difficulty construing and applying section
6.32.250. The statute's debtor-oriented protections conflict with the "just
and equitable" approach of most Washington courts and related statutes.
The legislature should repeal section 6.32.250 and replace it with a
spendthrift trust statute that is consistent with the policies of Washington
law. Alternatively, the legislature should encourage the courts to apply
common law doctrine to express spendthrift trusts by not enacting a replacement statute.
Thomas W. Read

alienation of the trust interest. Therefore, § 6.32.250 does little to fulfill the settlor's intent. More
often, it will serve to defeat the settlor's intentions regarding involuntary alienation of the trust interest.
109. See supra notes 62, 64 & 95, and accompanying text.
110. The Erickson court relied upon RESTATEMENT. supra note 1, § 157 in reaching its decision.
97 Wn. 2d at 252, 643 P.2d at 673.
111. See E. GRISWOLD. supra note 1, § 230. If the legislature did repeal the statute and chose to
replace it with a different statute rather than allow the common law to fill in the gaps, the legislature
should-and presumably would-maintain WASH. REV. CODE § 30.30.120 in some form as it applies
to spendthrift trusts. A statute that includes these and other policies is The Model Spendthrift Trust
Statute, drafted by Professor Griswold. This model statute's provisions appear in E. GRISWOLD. supra
note 1, at 647 app. A. For a comment on The Model Spendthrift Trust Statute, see Wicker, supra
note 1, at 15-18.

